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MARIHUANA: THE LEGISLATIVE CAULDRON,
A POT FULL OF TROUBLE
Background1
About five thousand years ago, somewhere on the rugged slopes of
central Asia, the ancient Chinese discovered the properties of an unusual plant-Cannabis sativa.2 This sturdy, flowering herb, used so
often in making rope, contained a resin which when ingested brought
on strange results. Like the "Lotos Eaters,"'3 its users experienced
flights of fantasy and euphoric delusions; they became greatly relaxed
and their inhibitions were lowered. The hedonistic enjoyment that the
plant induced led the more "moral" of the community to christen the
herb "Liberator of Sin."'4 The stories of the power of the Cannabis
slowly spread across the continent into India, where the drug was
quickly adopted into the religious and cultural life of the community.5
From India its use became prevalent in the Near East, Africa, and then
in Central and South America where it received the name by which
we know it-marihuana. 6
It is difficult to establish precisely how the drug came into the
United States. It is generally assumed that the practice of smoking the
drug was imported from Mexico through the southwestern states of
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.7 From the lower classes in these
1 For an interesting treatment of the history of marihuana use see, N. Taylor, The
Pleasant Assassin: The Story of Marihuana, in THE MARIHUANA PAPERS 31 (Solomon ed.
1966).
2 Although most languages had provided terms for the plant, it was officially designated Cannabis sativa by Linnaeus in 1753. Id. at 32.
3 Alfred Lord Tennyson,

The Lotos-Eaters, THE ATLANTIC

BOOK OF BrTISH AND

(Edith Sitwell ed. 1958).
4 Taylor, supra note 1, at 35.
5 See G.M. Carstairs, Bhang and Alcohol: CulturalFactors in the Choice of Intoxicants,
15 Q.J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 220 (1954).
The use of the drug remains deeply incorporated in the Indian cultural life.
It is found in three forms, often depending upon the class by which it is being
used: charas, bhang, and ganja. Regardless of hemp's nativity, it is the history of
India that reveals the real story of the plant. The kaleidoscopic facets of its culture, use, and abuse, together with a close intertwining of religion and philosophy,
are recorded in everything from the Vedas to a modern bazaar. In India the culture of hemp became almost a science and its use very dose to epicurean.
Taylor, supra note 1, at 36.
6 A.R. Lindesmith, The Marihuana Problem: Myth or Reality, in THE MARIHUANA
PAPERS 48, 51 (Solomon ed. 1966).
7 H.S. Becker, Marihuana: A Sociological Overview, in THE MARIHUANA PARms 65,
94 (Solomon ed. 1966).
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states the use spread to the ghettos of New Orleans and then to the
larger cities of the East. The Cannabis, or hemp, plant grows wild and
can be cultivated in most areas with a temperate or tropical climate.
While it is often mixed with liquids or in solid foods, usage in this
country is primarily confined to smoking the crushed, dried leaves. s
The practice remained relatively obscure, however, until about 1930
when it suddenly became the focal point of attack by the press and
various governmental agencies.9 By 1937 when the federal Marihuana
Tax Act was passed, the public had been well exposed to the exaggerated horrors of the drug. It had been connected with the commission of crimes of violence and sex; reports were common that hundreds
of school children were becoming addicted to it by the urgings of an
organized group of dispensers and that it was causally linked with
juvenile delinquency; it was generally believed that physical and
mental deterioration was a direct result of the prolonged habit of
smoking marihuana.' 0
Scientific studies on the subject were scarce, however, and the
stringent requirements of state laws made it difficult for investigators
to obtain permission to perform their work.'1 It is apparent that the
fear which engendered the strict legislation of the thirties was based on
misunderstandings and moral indignation rather than on any firm
scientific knowledge.
Physiologically, marihuana has been classified as a relatively harmless intoxicant. 12 It is accepted now that the main pharmacological
agent is tetrahydrocannabinol, a mild hallucinogen which is always
contained in the unpollinated flowers of the female plant.13 Although
8 Fort, Social and Legal Responses to Pleasure-Giving Drugs, in THE UTOPIATES 212
(Blum ed. 1964).
9 Winick, Marihuana Use By Young People, in DRUG ADDICTION IN YOUTH 20 (Harms
ed. 1965).
10 See, e.g., ROWELL & ROWELL, ON THE TRAIL OF MARIJUANA, THE WEED OF MADNESS

(1939).
We know that marijuana-1. Destroys will power, making a jellyfish of the user.
He cannot say no. 2. Eliminates the line between right and wrong, and substitutes
one's own warped desires or the base suggestions of others as the standard of
right. 3. Above all, causes crime; fills the victim with an irresistible urge to
violence. 4. Incites to revolting immoralities, including rape and murder. 5. Causes
many accidents both industrial and automobile. 6. Ruins careers forever. 7. Causes
insanity as its specialty. 8. Either in self-defense or as a means of revenue, users
make smokers of others, thus perpetuating the evil. Id. at 33.
11 See Zinberg and Weil, The Effects of Marijuana on Human Beings, N.Y. Times,

May 11, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), 28, 94.
12 Weil, Zinberg and Nelson, Clinical and Psychological Effects of Marihuana in Man,
162 SCIENCE 1234 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Weil). See also Grinspoon, Marihuana,
SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1969, 17 at 20.
13 GOODMAN & GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 300 (3d ed.
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the medical effects of the drug have been emphasized and exaggerated
in the past, a recent study14 has found that the physical reactions of
the body to the drug are relatively miniscule.
Our results were clear-cut, marihuana caused a moderate increase in heart rate, but not enough to make the subject conscious
of a rapid pulse, and it reddened the whites of the eyes. It had no
effect on pupil size, blood sugar, or respiratory rate.' 5
The external reactions of, the user will often bear a striking resemblance to those accompanying the use of alcohol. Reactions which
are alien to the user cannot be induced through the smoking of
marihuana.' 6 As with alcohol, the external symptoms reflect the basic
personality of the user.
In the course of discussions on the subject, many analogies are
drawn between marihuana and alcohol and between marihuana and
other drugs. These analogies can be at once helpful and confusing.
There is one basic distinction that should be borne in mind. Although
marihuana has long been legally classified as a narcotic, it is generally
accepted today that the drug is non-addictive. 17 The continuous use of
alcohol or the opiate derivatives will cause the user's system to adjust
itself chemically to their presence. This adjustment leads to a condition known as tolerance, after which the absence of these chemicals
will effect a malfunctioning and will cause the user to "withdraw."' s
Tetrahydrocannabinol produces no such adjustment. Although the
regular user of marihuana may form a psychological dependence because of his increasing desire to attain the state of relaxation which the
drug induces, 19 he will not become addicted to it and can cease using
20
it at his convenience.
The recent Weil study, concerning the short-term effects of the
drug, has concluded that it imposes little harm on the user's functional ability.2 1 "From our own study and from other studies in
14 Weil, supra note 12.

15 Zinberg and Weil, supra note 11, at 89.
16 See Becker, supra note 7; TASK FORCE REPORT:
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON

NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE,

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

THE

13 (1967)

(hereinafter cited TASK

FORCE REPORT).
17 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE
18

See

286 (1963).

EDWIN SCHUR, NARCOTICS ADDICTION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF

PUBLIC POLICY (1960).
19 See 32 U.N. BULL. ON NARCOTICS 722 (1965); see also Comment, Marijuana Laws:
A Need For Reform, 22 ARK. L. REV. 359 (1968).
20 MAYOR'S

COMMITTEE ON

NEW YORK (1944).

MARIJUANA,

THE

MARIJUANA

PROBLEM

IN THE CITY

OF

Portions of this most comprehensive and authoritative report are
printed in THE MARIHUANA PAPERS (Solomon ed. 1966) (hereinafter this study will be cited
as the LaGuardia Report).
21 Weil, supra note 12.
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progress it would seem-in short-term usage only-that the usual doses
of marihuana do not impair a user's ability to carry out successfully a
'22
wide range of tasks of ordinary complexity.
Another study, comparing the effects of marihuana and alcohol,
discovered great discrepancies between the effects of these drugs. The
tests involved simulated driving performance for experienced marihuana smokers. It was found that those using marihuana incurred
significant errors in only the speedometer tests, while the same subjects,
intoxicated from alcohol, accumulated significantly more accelerator,
brake, signal, speedometer, and total errors than under the normal
23
conditions.
The psychological effects of the drug cannot be as clearly measured. The subjective experiences of the user will vary from euphoric
to traumatic, according to his personality, 24 and often according to the
extent of dosage. 25 The use, however, has generally been associated
with a quiet, contemplative mood. As Dr. Allentuck describes the subjects he had observed in the LaGuardiastudy:
[There is] a sense of well-being and contentment, cheerfulness and
gaiety, talkativeness, bursts of singing and dancing, day dreaming,
a pleasant drowsiness, joking ....
The drowsiness, day dreaming
and unawareness of surroundings were present when the subject
was left alone .... But except for those who were allowed to pass
the time undisturbed, the pleasurable effects were interrupted from
time to time by disagreeable sensations .... A pronounced state of
anxiety reaching a panic stage, associated with fear of death or of
insanity, was observed only in those subjects experiencing the relatively few psychotic episodes and here the anxiety state led to pleas
for escape and not to acts of aggression. Even in the psychotic states
26
there were no uncontrollable outbursts of rage or acts of violence.
This tranquil attitude, found to accompany the use of the drug,
is not only an interesting scientific phenomenon but is of great social
import. This has been the main retort of the proponents of the drug to
the scare stories concerning the connection of the drug with crimes
of sex and violence. 27 It is now generally accepted that no causal relationship exists between marihuana and non-use crimes. 28
Zinberg and Well, supra note 11, at 89.
Crancer, Dille, Delay, Wallace, Haykin, Comparison of the Effects of Marihuana
and Alcohol on Simulated Driving Performance, 164 SCIENCE 851 (1969).
24 See Becker, supra note 7.
25 See Taylor, supra note 1.
26 LaGuardia Report, supra note 20, at 318.
27 Lindesmith, supra note 6, at 49-50.
28 See W. Bromberg, Marihuana: A Psychiatric Study, 4 J.A.M.A. 113 (1939); TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 13.
22

23
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There is not, however, universal acceptance of the innocent character of the drug.29 Various studies from the Middle East, the Near
East, and in the United States indicate that the mental effects can be
seriously detrimental.3 0 They have concluded that the "[e]motional
balance is disturbed by the waves of euphoria interspersed with phases
of anxiety; paranoid episodes are frequent-giving rise to disturbances
of conduct; volition and initiative are impaired; sensation is changed
and distorted; and even the so-called 'American-type' marihuana can
produce full-fledged hallucinations and delusions." 31 Cases have been
reported in which the subjects experience recurrences of the drug effects days, and, in some instances, weeks after the original use. 32 Observations have also been made as to the occurrence of psychopathology
after exposure to marihuana 33 and serious illness after intravenous
34
injections.
In 1968, the Committee on Problems of Drug Dependence of the
National Research Council and the Committee on Alcoholism and
Drug Dependence of the American Medical Association Council on
Mental Health issued a joint statement on the harmfulness of marihuana. 35 The report was based on an appraisal of all existing information by committee members, all of whom had had wide experience in
working with the drug problem. Among the points that were discussed,
it was stressed that:
1. Cannabis is a dangerous drug and is a public health concern.
Practically all societies in which it has been extensively used have
found it necessary to impose legal and social sanctions on users
and distributors. Although not addictive, it is a powerful psychoactive agent and where chronic heavy use occurs it often has a
marked effect in reducing the social productivity of the user.
2. Legalization of marihuana would probably create a serious
abuse problem in the United States. Currently used hemp products
are of low potency, but if controls were eliminated, more potent
(and dangerous) preparations would probably dominate the legal
market. 36
29 See Letters, W. Keup, 163 SCIENCE 1144 (1969) for a reply to the Weil study.
30 Miller, Marihuana: The Law and Its Enforcement, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 81, 82, n.2

(1968).
31 Id. at 83; Grinspoon, supra note 12, at 23.
32 Keeler, Spontaneous Recurrence of Marihuana Egects, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY No. 3,
384 (1968).
33 Talbott and Teague, Marihuana Psychosis: Acute Toxic Psychosis Associated with
The Use of Cannabis Derivatives, 210 J.A.M.A. 299 (1969).
34 King and Cowen, Effects of Intravenous Injections of Marihuana, 210 JA.M.A. 724
(1969).
35 204 JA.M.A. 1181.
36 Id.; see also Editorial, Marihuana Thing, 204 J.A.M.A. 1187 (1968).
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The one conclusion that can be drawn from all the various
studies and reports is that the short term effects of the drug are basically
innocuous to the individual user. The area that remains clouded, however, is that in which the long term psychiatric results are involved.
No studies have, as yet, delved into this area. It is apparent that this
is where society's true interest must rest and the realm in which the
debate over the true harmfulness of the drug must rage. 37
Present Legislation
The gross exaggeration and misunderstanding of the evils of marihuana that were so prevalent during the Thirties led CongTess to pass
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.38 This bill was passed at the urging
of Henry J. Asslinger, head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. After
a brief hearing, the bill was adopted by Congress on the ground that
marihuana was a highly dangerous drug, inciting its users to commit
crimes of violence and often leading to insanity.39 As a result of these
misunderstandings, Congress provided severe penalties-up to five
years for any violation-which became increasingly more severe. By
1968 the maximum penalty had been raised to forty years, with no
probation for second offenders, and a minimum sentence of five years
40
was mandatory.
The imposition of state control flowered basically from the same
seeds sown in the federal publicity campaign. 41 Until 1930, only sixteen states had imposed laws concerning the use and possession of marihuana. 42 However, with the passage of the federal statute, state legislatures began to follow the lead of the federal government and imposed
their own prohibitions. In almost all cases, control of the drug has followed an unaltered direction of increasingly harsh penalties. 43 Although the punitive sanctions vary, all but three of the states have
adopted the Uniform Narcotic Control Act. 44 The penalties typically
range from one to fifteen years imprisonment and fines of $1000 to
37 Zinberg and Weil, supra note 11, at 94.

38 50 Stat. 551, 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964).
39 See Hearings on H.R. 6906 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance of
the U.S. Senate, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); see also Comment, supra note 19, at 362.
40 It must be noted that the enforcement of this act has been declared unconstitutional
in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), as a violation of the right against selfincrimination. The Court concluded the opinion, however, by stating "nothing in what
we hold today implies any constitutional disability in Congress to deal with marijuana
traffic by other means." Id. at 54.
41 Lindesmith, supra note 6, at 53-58.
42 Becker, supra note 7, at 94.
43 Comment, supra note 19, at 362.
44 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
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$10,000 for first offense. 4 5 New Jersey adopted the Uniform Act in
1933. As amended in 1966, the act provides that a violation of any
provision which includes possession and sale of marihuana will be a
high misdemeanor. 46 The punishment ranges from two to fifteen years
47
for a first offense to ten years to life imprisonment for a third offense.
There is no distinction made in the statute between marihuana and
other drugs classified as narcotics. In most of the states, marihuana,
morphine, heroin, and cocaine are treated in exactly the same manner
in terms of punishment, although these substances have very different
effects upon the human body and are used by very different types of
individuals.
The conclusion is inescapable that these unimaginative and ineffective laws were drawn under misconceptions as to the dangers of
marihuana and its addictive qualities. These sanctions have been evidently founded on the premise that marihuana is virtually as dangerous as the opiate derivatives and the more powerful hallucinogens.
48

Constitutional Attacks

Whether one is a protagonist of the drug or wholly opposed to its
use, it must be generally accepted that the laws which attempt to deal
with marihuana are at best adequate. Although it appears unlikely
that these laws will be successfully attacked through the judicial
process, an outline of the various avenues of assault may be helpful in
understanding the position of those who have attempted this means.
It should be noted in reviewing these arguments that what is being
discussed is the use of the drug and not its abuse. The proponents of
the drug are basically urging that the individual should be at liberty
to intoxicate himself with marihuana to the same extent that he would
be free to use alcohol. When such an individual abuses this right-by
driving while intoxicated or making himself a public nuisance-he
should be reprimanded to the same extent as he would had he been
under the influence of alcohol.
45 See generally W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1967) for a comparison
of the various state laws.
46 N.J. REv. STAT. 24:18-1 et seq. (1937).
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. 24:18-47(c) (supp. 1969-70). N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:170-8 (Supp. 196970), however, provides that use and intoxication are violations of the Disorderly Persons'
Act. Most marihuana prosecutions in New Jersey are proceeded on under this act, notwithstanding the fact that a violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 24:18-47 is involved.
48 For a comprehensive treatment of the constitutional attack on this legislation
see generally Comment, Marijuana and the Law: The Constitutional Challenges to the
Marijuana Laws in Light of the Social Aspects of Marijuana Use, 13 ViiL.. L. Ray. 851
(1968); see also Osteri and Silverglate, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Constitutional Dimensions
of the Marihuana Problem, 3 SUFFOLK L. REv. 55 (1968).
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Governmental Prohibition as an Invasion of Privacy
The constitutional attack upon this legislation will be many
pronged. However, at the foundation of the case is the basic philosophy
that a man should be free to direct his own course of conduct when no
other party is injured. As it is an entirely private matter, the state
49
should have no right to interfere.
Although no explicit recognition of a right to privacy can be
found in the federal constitution, the Supreme Court has interpreted
this right as being essential to the several guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. In Griswold v. Connecticut,5" the Court struck down as unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which made it unlawful for any
person to use "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." 51 Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the "guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance." 52 The Court found that the marital privacy is
within such a penumbra and as such would present a bar to criminal
prosecution under the statute.
It must be understood that this sheltered area of privacy is distinct
from the classic protection of the fourth and fifth amendments. The
latter are guarantees of security from unlawful activities on the part of
government agents; they provide protection from unsavory means of
enforcing legislation that is otherwise lawful. The zone of privacy as
found in Griswold, on the other hand, is a realm into which the state
has no authority to delve without a compelling reason regardless of the
53
means employed.
In the past, substantive zones of privacy have been related to express constitutional rights such as the freedom of speech5 4 and the
freedom of belief. 55 In Griswold, the Court apparently recognized the
existence of privacy without any complex association to one, specific
right. The personal choice whether to use marihuana may be within
49 See generally Weiss and Wizner, Pot, Prayer, Politics, and Privacy: The Right to
Cut Your Own Throat in Your Own Way, 54 IA. L. REV. 709 (1969).
50 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32.
52 381 US. at 484.
53 See Comment, supra note 48, at 862. This confusion can be observed in the lower
court opinion in Commonwealth v. Leis, (Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 Suffolk Superior
Ct., Mass., Dec. 1967).
54 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
55 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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this same area of privacy. Since the individual is merely indulging in a
relaxing form of intoxication with no apparent injury, the state has no
right to thrust its sanctions on the individual's right to choose.
Once the court reaches this conclusion, the government would be
required to show that the community interests which the regulation
purports to protect outweigh the interest of the individual in enjoying
his constitutional freedom. In balancing the present interests "unless
the state were able to show some more weighty societal interest in imposing the harsh penalties currently attached to private use of marihuana, a court could find that the individual's liberty to enjoy the
drug's euphoric qualities is superior to society's interest in suppressing
this type of private conduct." 56
In Commonwealth v. Leis, 57 a constitutional attack was made upon
the Massachusetts narcotics law by a number of defendants being
prosecuted for possession of marihuana. This case involves one of the
most exhaustive judicial inquiries into the nature of marihuana yet
made. However, both the trial court and the state's highest court failed
to accept any of the grounds for dismissal urged by the petitioners. It
was argued that the law constituted an invasion of the privacy of the
petitioners. The Court summarily dismissed this contention.
The defendants insist that the right to smoke marihuana is guaranteed by the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and the United
States and must be balanced against the interests of the State in
prohibiting its use. No such right exists. It is not specifically preserved by either Constitution. The right to smoke marihuana is not
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . .necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." [citations omitted]
It is not within a "zone of privacy" formed by the "penumbras"
of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments and the Ninth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. [citations
omitted] The defendants have no right, fundamental or otherwise,
to become intoxicated by means of the smoking of marihuana.
[citations omitted] 58
In light of the doubts that continue to surround the labeling of
marihuana as a safe intoxicant and the strong presumption of reasonableness surrounding legislative acts, it appears unlikely that the "freedom of privacy" argument will find any great judicial support; and the
attitude founded in Leis will continue to be expressed.
56 Comment, supra note 19, at 373.
57 - Mass. -, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
58 Id. at -, 243 N.E.2d at 903-04.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 41

Substantive Due Process
Governmental prohibition of use and possession of marihuana has
also been assailed by means of the concept of substantive due process. 59
In Robinson v. California" the Supreme Court held that criminal
prosecution for narcotic addiction is repugnant to the Constitution.
The legislation struck down in this case and in subsequent cases involving statutes against chronic alcoholism 6' and vagrancy 6 2 has been
spoken of in terms of "status crimes." '6 3 The basic principle involved
in this concept is that there are certain conditions that the state cannot
penalize without violating the social conscience of the community. The
question which is raised is not whether the punishment is too grave
but whether standards of decency will allow any punishment to be imposed.64
Although this argument has found success in attacking the status
crimes discussed, the Court quickly distinguished such from crimes of
action. In Powell v. Texas6 5 the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for
being drunk while in public was upheld. In distinguishing Robinson
the Court stated:
The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status ....
Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for
public behavior which may create substantive health and safety
hazards, both for the appellant and for members of the general
public, and which offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of a
large segment of the community. 66
It is difficult to imagine a court applying this argument to strike
down a conviction involving marihuana. Even if use and possession
were considered as factors of the "status" crimes, with marihuana there
is no analogous "status" which is being prosecuted. As noted above, 67
although marihuana is classified as a narcotic, it possesses no addictive
qualities. It would thus contain no basis upon which to construct a
"status."
59 Comment, supra note 48, at 866-67. For an overall discussion of the concept of
substantive due process see Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Hav. L.
RE'V. 1071 (1964).
60 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
61 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
62 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
63 See Comment, supra note 48.
64 See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635 (1966).
65 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
66 Id.

at 532.

67 Supra in text.
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Excessive Punishment
Related to the substantive due process argument is another theory
based on the eighth amendment. While the conflict rages over absolute
prohibition and complete liberalization, the one area in which is found
the most agreement concerns the insensibility of the punishment authorized by the statutes. Although the thrust of a Robinson based attack
may fall short of barring governmental proscription, it may have
enough force to shatter the penalties which have proved to be the most
intolerable function of the legislation.""
The applicability of this eighth amendment approach was intimated in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Robinson, in which
he noted that "punishment out of all proportion to the offense may
bring it within the ban against 'cruel and inhuman punishment.' "69
This constitutional ban does not merely concern excessive punishment 70 but is also seen as demanding a punishment appropriate for
the crime.
Tile primary purpose of [the eighth amendment] has always been
considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind
of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes; the
nature of the conduct made criminal is ordinarily relevant only
to the fitness of the punishment imposed. 71
The social objectives which are sought to be achieved by the imposition of criminal sanctions are complex and often intertwined.
Among them are rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, condemnation.7 2 Every criminal sentence will have at its foundation a various
blending of these purposes. The nature of marihuana possession and
use offenses and attitudes toward them weaken the foundations and
distort many of the classic purposes.
The concept of rehabilitation is based primarily on the state's desire to adjust what is considered to be deviant moral and social values
into those which are more consistent with the norms that society fosters.
However, marihuana use is an activity in which no victims are injured.
Also, the "deviant" attitudes involved are often accompanied by a
sincere belief that the activity should be strictly a matter of personal
choice. In such cases the traditional rehabilitory methods founded on
See Comment, supra note 48 at 869.
370 U.S. at 676.
70 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In this case the Court first employed the ban, in striking down a twelve year hard labor sentence which had been
imposed for falsifying public records.
71 392 U.S. at 531-32.
72 See generally Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960).
68

69
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incarceration will be entirely inadequate. A true adjustment can only
be achieved by education through an intellectual process rather than
through meaningless penal sanctions.
Retribution plays, at most, a limited role in this prohibition.
Violations cause no harm to individuals other than the violator. Therefore, little emotional desire is aroused in the community to balance
the scales by punishing the offender. Since the retributional desire is
negligible, it would be difficult to justify the severe penalties on this
ground.
Deterrence is often to be considered the main objective to be
achieved through the imposition of harsh penalties. The increasing
state and federal penalties over the years is evidence of the legislative
attempts to halt the use of the drug. Statistics on marihuana violations
and estimates on marihuana usage, however, seem to refute the existence of any added deterrent effect from an increase in the penalties.
The lack of effectiveness of the methods employed must indicate a loss
of importance in the relationship between the objective and the means
of attaining it. The attempts to deter the use of the drug might be more
effectively channeled into educational endeavors similar to those which
must be used in rehabilitation.
Perhaps the most significant goal in punishing the use and possession of marihuana is community condemnation. 3 Criminal sanctions
are also imposed for the purpose of emphasizing the respect which certain norms of the community deserve. Thus society has determined that
the smoking of marihuana is an undesirable and immoral activity. In
order to accentuate this envisioned evil, stern penal codes were established. It is obvious that initially the passage of the marihuana laws
was based on an abhorrence for this hedonistic activity rather than
from scientific evidence of the harms produced.7 4 Although such social
reaffirmation of values is seen as a necessity for the maintenance of the
fabric of the community, the results of this as the basis for punishment
must be carefully weighed. It has been noted that the present marihuana
laws, instead of solidifying a traditional moral value, are dividing
society itself and tending to destroy one of our most basic normsrespect for the law.
In evaluating the question of whether the punishment is appropriate for the crime, the court must be willing to enter into a consideration of all the relevant scientific evidence which is available.
Comment, supra note 48, at 871.
See Murphy, The Cannabis Habit: A Review Of Recent Psychiatric Literature,
15 U.N. BULL. ON NARCOTICS 3, 21 (1963).
73

74
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Without this it would be impossible to balance the evil and the penalty.
However, courts have shown a great reluctance in entering into such an
investigation. 75 In the single instance where the court did involve itself
in intensive investigation, it was concluded that even on the basis of
the limited scientific evidence available, there was sufficient harm to
justify the penalties. 6
Equal Protection

The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides in part
that "[n]o State shall .. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction

equal protection of the laws." Thus, it has been held that a statute
must cover all persons whose inclusion is necessary, logically, scientifically, or by reason of common sense, to effectuate the legitimate
77
objectives of the statute.
One of the foremost cases in which this clause was applied was
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 7 In that case the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law which required sterilization of all persons convicted two or more times of a crime involving moral turpitude. Chicken
theft was included as such a crime while embezzlement was not. The
Court reasoned that "[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense ... it has

made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular
' ' 79
race or nationality for oppressive treatments.
This rationale was employed by the defense in Commonwealth v.
Leis. It was contended that the legislature was acting outside its power
in proscribing behavior of one class of people (those who choose to
enjoy a mild state of intoxication with marihuana) and merely regulating the similar activity of another class (those seeking a mild state of
intoxication from alcohol). The Court did not accept this argument;
it found that:
[t]here are at least two distinctions between alcohol and the "mindaltering" intoxicants that are defined by the law as narcotic drugs.
75 See Leary v. U.S., 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); concurring
opinion of Justice Kirk in Commonwealth v. Leis, - Mass. ,
.,243 N.E.2d 898, 906
(1969).
76 Nos. 28841-2, 18844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Superior Ct., Mass.). It should be noted
that on appeal it was held that the defendants had had no standing to raise this issue
since they had not yet been tried on the indictment. - Mass. at -, 243 N.E.2d at 906.
See also State v. Mpetas, 79 N.J. Super. 202, 191 A.2d 186 (App. Div. 1963) in which it
was held that a sentence of three to five years in a State prison for unlawful possession
of the drug did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and was not excessive.
77 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
78 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
79

Id. at 541.
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First, alcohol is susceptible to a less restrictive alternative means of
control. There are recognized, accurate means of determining its
use and its abuse. Second, the effects of alcohol upon the user are
known. We think that the Legislature is warranted in treating this
known intoxicant differently from marihuana, LSD, or heroin, the
effects of which are largely still unknown and subject to extensive
dispute. The Legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm and
may confine its restrictions to instances where it determines the
need for them is clearest. [citations omitted]8 0
This argument was also raised in People v. Aquiar.8s In answering
this assault, the California Supreme Court held that "in light of present
medical attitudes toward marihuana, we cannot say that the proscription
against the possession of marihuana is palpably arbitrary and erroneous
8' ' 2
beyond rational doubt.
Although it may be argued that Skinner requires that the state
show more than just some reason for the discrimination between what
are basically similar offenses,8 it is unlikely that a defendant will find
protection in the fourteenth amendment guarantee. So long as doubts
remain as to the actual effects of marihuana, the courts will be able to
find some possible justification for the legislative classification and will
therefore affirm it.
Freedom of Religion
A more novel and perhaps more far reaching attack on the constitutionality of absolute marihuana prohibition rests on the first
amendment guarantee that "Congress shall make no laws respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof."
This argument was successfully employed in a case involving another hallucinogenic drug. In People v. Woody, 8 4 defendants, a group
of Navajo Indians, were convicted of violating a section of the health
code.8 5 They were all members of the Native American Church, a sect
the theology of which combines certain Christian teachings with a
liturgy that is devoted to the use of the drug peyote. The followers believe that the drug embodies, in itself, the Holy Spirit and that those
who partake enter into a direct contact with God. Peyote is a hallucenogenic substance contained in buttonshaped growths of a cactus plant;
80 -

Mass. at -,

243 N.E.2d at 905.

81 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968).
82 Id. at 605, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 176.*
83 See Boyko and Rotberg, Constitutional Objections to California's Marijuana
Statute, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 773 (1967).
84 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
85 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500; for the position of the State in this matter
see 39:276 Op. ATr'" GEN. 62-93 (May, 18, 1962).
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it is composed basically of mescaline.8 6 The use of the drug is prohibited
under California law. The California Supreme Court found that since
the Indians were using the drug in a sincere act of religious faith, any
attempt to impose restrictions would be an infringement of their constitutional rights. The court carefully examined the meaning of peyote
to the sect and pointed out that "although peyote serves as a sacramental
symbol similar to bread and wine in certain churches, it is much more
than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship;
prayers are directed to it much as prayers are directed to the Holy
Ghost."87 In reversing the conviction, the court concluded that "[t]o
forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyotism." 88 Unlike other cases in which the courts have upheld governmental restraints on religious practices, 9 the Court found that the use
of peyote was not merely an ancilliary aid in the religious experience,
but was the sine qua non of its existence. 90
It is reasonable to assume that if the Indian religion had centered
about marihuana rather than peyote, the court would have achieved
the same result. However, in a normal instance of a conviction, the
apparent requirements of this defense would impose a sturdy barrier.
It may be argued that the protection of the first amendment should
extend to all those who employ marihuana in an attempt to achieve a
"religious experience." 91 However, it is doubtful that the courts will
be willing to accept a "religious" experience as protected unless it is
within some historical setting of a formalized religion. 92 This attitude
of care in defining "religion" is found in the approach taken by the
court in Woody. The court went to great length to point out the tra86 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
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at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
89 See Braunjeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) which dealt with Sunday dosing laws; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) and
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) which dealt with polygamy.
90 61 Cal. 2d at 725, 394 P.2d at 819-20, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
91 Watts, Psychedelics and Religious Experience, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1968).
92 See D. A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Developnent: Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381.
Thus far courts have recognized exemptions from regulations relating to
psychological purposes only when the behavior was limited to well defined ceremonial occasions. By limiting exemptions to these occasions, the favored behavior
had no impact in subtracting from the purposes of the regulation .. .or it was
directly related to the worship of God and strictly limited in intensity, time, and
place by a theological system of discipline. . . . Thus, the indiscriminate use of
hallucinogenic agents, in accordance with some private religious mystique, would
have extremely difficult sledding in the courts.
Id. at 1427-28.
88 Id.
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dition involved in the Native American Church and the solemnity attached to its ceremonies. In light of the casual and sporadic use which
marihuana is subjected to by a great majority of its adherents, it would
be difficult to imagine a court willing to draw the analogy. But even
if the courts interpret such activities as within the realm of protected
religious experience, they are apt to view such claims with great
scrutiny. It is likely that they will be especially stringent in requiring
proof of a defendant's sincerity.
In a case decided the same day as Woody, 93 the court emphasized
the necessity that for one to be subject to the protection he must show
that his asserted belief was real. The petitioner had claimed to be a
"self-styled peyote preacher" acting as the spiritual leader of a group of
individuals, and that his group would use peyote entirely for spiritual
purposes. In light of the holding in Woody, the court remanded the
case.
Unlike the situation in Woody however, the defendant here has
not proved that his asserted belief was an honest and bona fide
one. A factual question remains as to whether defendant actually
engaged in good faith in the practice of a religion. As we said in
Woody "the trier of fact need inquire only into the question of
whether the defendant's belief in Peyotism is honest and in good
faith .. .or whether he seeks to wear the mantle of religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities." 94
This avenue of attack was utilized by Dr. Timothy Leary in defense
of his conviction under the Marihuana Tax Act. He argued that the
laws prohibiting the use, possession, and free trading of the drug are
laws that abridge religious freedom.9 5 Central to this contention is the
assertion that marihuana plays an integral role in the exercise of his
religion and that its use should be protected as within the free exercise
of his religion. 96 The Court of Appeals did not accept this argument
and quickly dismissed the analogy drawn to the peyote cases. 97 The
court initially found that there was no evidence that the use of marihuana was a formal requisite to the practice of Hinduism-the religion
98
which Dr. Leary professed.
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. 99 However, since
the court found that the requirements of registration were a violation
93 In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
94 Id. at 888, 394 P.2d at 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
95 383 F.2d 851.
96 Chayet, Legal Aspects of Drug Abuse, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 15 (1968).
97 383 F.2d at 861.
98 Id. at 860.
99 Leary v. United States, 392 U.S. 903 (1969).
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of the fifth amendment guarantees against self-incrimination and the
presumption of illegal importation was abhorrent to our system of
justice, there was no need for our highest court to answer directly the
other questions involved.1 00
Conclusion
In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley gave us a glimpse of future
society. Perpetuated through controlled eugenics, man could find solace
from the mechanical regularity of his existence only through the use
of drugs. Soma relieved his tension, eased his pain, and gave him
pleasure. Man had become so dependent upon the drug that life without it was unbearable; but with it imagination was stifled and creativity
crushed. The concept of such an existence is frightening and repulsive
but is it merely a fantastic improbability?
Many objections have been posited in opposition to the use of
marihuana. A great majority of them are based on the same bad science
and misunderstanding that gave rise to the extant legislation. There is
no evidence whatsoever that marihuana induces criminal behavior; the
present understanding indicates the contrary. Nor is there a causal
relation between the use of marihuana and the use of "hard" narcotics. 1 1 Both of these relationships stem not from an inherent quality
of the intoxicant but, rather, from the external forces that have been
imposed by society. As a consequence of the drug subculture created
by community condemnation, the youthful marihuana user will come
into contact with pushers and confirmed criminals. Because of legal
classification, the same person selling marihuana will be pushing heroin.
The adolescent, having recently discovered that marihuana is not as evil
as the adult society wanted him to believe it was, finds himself curious
as to the effects of other drugs.
It is altogether too simple to state that marihuana causes deviant
behavior. The forces at work are too complex and interrelated to allow
us to dismiss the experience with such brevity.
2
However, legitimate objections to the drug have been expressed. 10
100 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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PUBLIC POLICY 30 (1960). This work presents an interesting comparison between the treatment of the drug problem in England, where it is considered a medical concern, and in
the United States, where it is predominantly a criminal matter.
102 It must be noted that serious opinions have been expressed as to the wisdom of
adding another, even harmless, intoxicant to our social problems. See Lang, The President's
Crime Commission Task Force Report on Narcotics and Drug Abuse: A Critique of the
Apologia, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 847 (1968).
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Foremost among these is the fact that we just do not know enough
about the drug to permit its widespread use. Although it appears that
the individual's use of the intoxicant should be a private matter, the
potential does exist for a societal harm. As long as this possibility does
exist, society must have the ability to protect its interest through some
form of control.
This control cannot be arbitrary. In order to be effective there
must exist, in the minds of all in society as well as in fact, a meaningful
relationship between the control and the potential harm. All scientific,
social, and psychological evidence available must be taken into consideration before action is taken. Although the courts are reluctant,
and rightfully so, to go into such prolonged investigation, the legislature
cannot be. They must anxiously enter into an inquiry not merely with
lengthy and wasteful legislative hearings, but by means of commissions
with the expertise and financial strength to attain results.
Such action cannot be long put off. A generation has grown
familiar with the extensive use of the drug and with the absurdly
severe penalties which are attached. Its future attitude toward the
drug and toward law in general is a matter of speculation. However,
the results of inaction could be disastrous and certainly not worth the
gamble.
John J. Hughes
whereby consumption of a toxic substance has been sanctioned in varying degrees
on a mass level does not logically lead to the conclusion that society should release
another toxic substance for mass consumption.
Id. at 854. Goddard, Should It Be Legalized? Soon We Will Know, LIFE, Oct. 31, 1969, at
34. See also Tauro, Marijuaunaand Relevant Problerns-1969,7 As,. CRUM. L.Q. 174 (1969).

